None of the Israeli major intelligence services, SHABAK, MOSSAD and Military Intelligence,
predicted the Arab Spring. After it started they were unable to predict the fall of Mubarak.
Even now, they do not have a clear idea as to its outcome. In this they are not different
from other intelligence services, and from the so called experts and journalists. Be this as it may,
the knowledge of what happens next door is of paramount importance to Israel. This
failure of of intelligence is not less important than any other such failure in the 65 years of
Israel's existence.
Failures of intelligence are in fact failures in analysis of raw, frequently contradictory, data in
drawing conclusions and making decisions. The process is much wider than strictly
professional intelligence. Most of the times the failure or success is determined by other
military and civilian leaders. At the end it is the commander in chief, whatever his or her
formal title is, who makes the decision.
In summer of 1973, 44 years old Major Shlomo Baum serving his 30 days annual reserve
service in Sinai not far from the Suez Canal noticed unusual movements of the Egyptian
Army across the canal. He reported it to his superior officers, who dismissed the
information. Baum who knew Ariel Sharon from the famous, some would say infamous, 101
Unit, called him up. At that time General Sharon was the Commander of the Southern
Command. Sharon ordered alert. Baum's superiors did as ordered, but complained about
the unnecessary move, because of friendship of Baum and Sharon. In his memoir of the
Yom Kippur war Saadat wrote that he planned the war for summer, but the alert of IDF forced
him to change plans.
Israeli intelligence was surprised by the war which was launched in October. Newspapers
blamed the ruling conventional wisdom concepts, which they called the “conception,” or
CONSEPTSYA, which precluded war. Without concepts thinking, decision making is
impossible. The concepts must however be constantly evaluated and criticized. Pierre
Bourdieu in very different context regarded the inability of social and political scientists to
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| Commander in Chief |
reflect critically on their assumptions and concepts a major weakness of these disciplines.
In the first few days Yom Kippur was, to say the least, difficult for Israel. On the basis of
the same intelligence the Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan, the adored hero military leader
and the Prime Minister, the grandma Golda Meir reached opposite decisions. Dayan
wanted to admit defeat, Meir thought that victory can still be achieved. She became the de
facto commander in chief, and made strategic and tactical military decisions.
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| Truman - against the "wise men" |
Many times failures of intelligence stem
from the fact that heads of such services
do not fully understand, or perhaps
cannot internalize the rules of decision
making. Human decision takes place only under uncertainty.
The future and its consequences are unknown, and
in spite of that a decision has to be taken.
If everything is known, there is no decision,
a computer would do the job better.
In 1948 the US had to decide whether to recognize soon to
be born the new State of Israel. George Marshall, the
legendary war hero, whom Churchill called the “organizer of
the victory,” the originator of the Marshall Plan for Europe, was the Secretary of State. He
strongly objected to recognition of Israel. The “wise men” in the Department, Acheason,
Kennan, Bohlen and others supported him, so did the CIA, which predicted that Jews will
lose the war. Marshall threatened to resign. He insisted that the written protocol of meeting with
Truman will state that he will not vote for him, if overruled. Truman decided to
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| Begin - Osiris Strike - against the Mossad |
recognize Israel. The strong objections of Marshall
and the “wise men” are remembered only as a
footnote to history.
Meir Dagan, the former head of MOSSAD, and
Yuval Diskin, the former head of SHABAK do not
think that failure in the past precludes them from
continuing to be experts about the future. They claim
to know what Iran is and how it will respond to attack
by Israel.
The fact is, however, that future in the matter of Iran
is unchartered territory, not only for Israel and the
United States, but probably for Iran too.
It will take a missile several minutes to reach Israel. Israel is a tiny country, even if it has a
massive nuclear capability, second strike may be too late. Is Iran “rational” as some claim?
Rational or not, it is difficult to understand the rationale of sending children to war with
formal passport to heaven if they die as it did in Iraq-Iran war, and to figure out what was the
political or military gain in killing 85 Jews in Buenos Aires in the eighties.
Will military attack destroy or delay Iran's capability to make a nuclear weapon? Will such
attack remove the clerics from power? Can Israel rely on the US? How far will Obama go
with Iran if he is reelected?
Those are hundreds more questions do not have easy, clear and easy answers. Uncertainty and
difficulties notwithstanding, a decision must be taken. The commander in chief will have to make
it.
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